What is the effect on saving of a reduction in current taxes combined with an offsetting incre=e in taxes later in an individual's life? In a world of perfect capital markets and no uncertainty, the individual should save the entire amount of the tax cut. In the real world, however, people face significant uncertainty about their future income, and because proportional or progressive income taxes reduce the variance of income, those taxes provide insurance against this uncertainty. An increase in future taxes increases this insurance and, through the precautionary saving motive, reduces an individual's saving relative to the Ricardian benchmark just stated (see Chan, 1983 , Barsky, Mankiw and Zeldes, 1986 , and Kimball and Mankiw, 1989 . The increased insurance provided by higher future taxes may have another effect on saving as well: it may change the composition of saving, because the reduction in labor income risk can affect the amount of financial risk that an individual chooses to bear. In this paper we explore the effect of labor income taxes on the willingness to bear financial risk.
We study a two-period life-cycle model in which individuals make two choices: how much to save in total, and how to divide that saving between a risky asset and a risk-free asset. We find that, given plausible restrictions on preferences, any change in taxes that reduces an individual's labor income risk and does not make her worse off will lead her to invest more in the risky asset.
This result holds even when labor income is statistically independent of the return to the risky asset, although not if the risky asset actually provides insurance for labor income risk. We also find that the effect of labor income risk on financial risk-taking can be quantitatively important for realistic changes in tax rates.
Consider again the deferral of labor income taxes with no change in the expected value within a person's lifetime. In a neoclassical world with certain labor income, this tax reduction leaves national saving unchanged by raising private saving = much as public saving falls. It also has no effect on investment in the risky asset, because the future tax liability involves no risk and individuals want to offset that liability by holding more of the riskless =set. In a world with uncertain labor income, however, our analysis shows that deferring labor income taxes raises investment in the risky asset .1 In essence, individuals respond to a reduction in one risk by increasing their exposure to another risk .2 Surprisingly, the effect of this tax deferral on overall saving becomes unclear once we allow for changes in financial risk-taking. If the uncertainty of labor income were the only risk faced by an individual, then the standard analysis would apply: the individual would consume more and national saving would fall. But when the individual h= the opportunity to invest more in the risky asset, the additional uncertainty that this action creates will tend to decrease consumption and raise saving. In fact, we cannot rule out the possibility that this indirect precautionary effect might outweigh the direct precautionary effect and produce a net increase in saving.
Our analytic results raise two questions. First, is quantitatively important in people's portfolio selections?
and present some illustrative calculations to that effect the effect of taxes on labor income risk We argue that it is likely to be important in the penultimate section of the paper.
Second, is encouraging greater financial risk-taking a socially desirable or undesirable feature of labor income taxes? In their seminal paper on taxes and risk-taking, Domar and Musgrave (1944) write that "there is no question that increased risk-taking ... is highly desirable" (p. 391). They do not justify this claim, however, nor do most of the researchers who have followed them in work on this topic. A complete investigation of this issue lies well beyond the scope of this paper, although we can suggest several reasons why private markets might generate too little risky investment.3
First and foremost is the lack of a complete market for human capital. Because human capital risk is undiversifiable for an individual but largely diversifiable for society as a whole, there is no presumption that individuals will undertake the socially optimal amount of risky investment in either human or physical capital. Indeed, we think there is some presumption that the optimal conditions can be approached more closely by diversifying idiosyncratic human capital risk through the tax system.4
Imperfections in the market for financial capital may inhibit risky investment as well. For example, entrepreneurs may be unable to diversify away the idiosyncratic risk of their projects economically active people, mitigating concerns with adverse selection." because adverse selection discourages the participation of outside investors. Since entrepreneurs' labor income is highly correlated with the return to their financial capital, incre=ing the labor income tax rate is especially likely to increase their risky capital investment, as we show later.
Third, the social return to risky investment will exceed the private return if there are technological spillovers or other positive externalities from such investment. For example, Shleifer and Vishny (1987) argue that aggregate demand externalities in an imperfectly competitive economy make the optimal amount of risky investment greater than the amount chosen (in the absence of taxes) by profit-maximizing firms. Fourth, capital income taxes at both the corporate and personal levels may have powerful effects on financial risk-taking. Unfortunately, there is little theoretical or empirical consensus on the direction or size of these effects, = shown by Sandmo's (1985) survey.
The paper is organized research. Section II presents the quantitative significance as follows. Section I discusses our work's relationship to previous the model, and Section III gives the main results. Section IV considers of the results, and Section V concludes.
I. Relationship to the Literature
In its analysis of the effect of labor income taxes on the demand for risky assets, this paper bridges two lines of research. The first is concerned with the role of income taxes in providing insurance for risky labor income, and the resulting effect on the consumption/saving decision. The starting point for this research is the analysis of the consumption/saving decision under uncertainty, which began in earnest with Leland (1968) , Sandmo (1970) , Rothschild and Stiglitz (1971) , and Dr&ze and Modigliani (1972) . Recent contributions include Skinner (1988) , Zeldes (1989 ), Kimball (1990a , Caballero (1990 ), Weil (1991 , and Kimball and Weil (1991) . Some research in this group examines the aggregate demand effects of tax cuts-for example, the papers mentioned in the introduction. Other research evaluates the welfare effects of redistributive taxation-for example, Eaton and Rosen (1980) , Varian (1980 ), E~ley, Kiefer and Possen (1993 .
All of this work, however, focuses on the effect of labor income taxes Devereux and Smith on total saving and investment, and says little about the possible effects of these taxes on portfolio composition. For example, Dr&ze and Modigliani discuss portfolio choices but determine only the conditions for their separability from saving decisions and conclude that perfect insurance markets for labor income are essential for separation to hold. Varian determines the optimal tax schedule as a balancing of the direct beneficial effect of social insurance on people's utility and the detrimental effect of social insurance on people's saving. If it is appropriate to encourage investment in risky~sets, then the implicit insurance provided by taxes h= an additional benefit neglected by Varian.
The second line of research is concerned with the role of capital taxes in providing insurance for financial risks and thus affecting the amount of financial risk-taking in the economy. Domar and Musgrave (1944) , and many following them, analyze optimal portfolio selection among a collection of fully marketable securities. Some of this research (summarized by Sandmo, 1985) includes the consumption/saving decision (Sandmo, 1969 and Ahsan, 1976) but does not allow for risky labor income. Friend and Blume (1975) discuss the role of human capital in their empirical study of the "market price of risk," but they =sume a fixed amount of savings and taxes as insurance. Feldstein (1969) notes that "the optimal portfolio is not independent of the uncertainty of his other income sources" (p.
do not address the role of behavior for an individual 762) but does not pursue the idea. Davies and Whalley (1991) analyze the effects of taxes on human and physical capital formation, but do not allow for uncertainty.
The existing analyses of financial capital do not suffice as analyses of human capital because of fundamental differences between the two =ets. First, human capital can be acquired but not r=old-that is, human capital investment is irreversible except for a small amount of depreciation.
Thus, the timing of decisions to invest in human capital is different from that for investing in most financial -ets.
Second, the return to human capital depends on both unobservable effort and a large random element. This means that human capital risk is privately undiversifiable and uninsurable. Third, the random element in human capital returns is largely idiosyncratic. This provides the opportunity for the government to reduce each individual's human capital risk without taking on additional risk itself.5
This paper is also related to research on the possible "crowding in" of investment by government debt. Consider a reduction in taxes today accompanied by an offsetting increase in taxes in the future. Friedman (1978) argues that such a shift in the timing of taxes might reduce the cost of equity capital (though it would raise the cost of debt capital) and thus incre=e real investment.G Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987) discuss crowding in that results from deferring capital income taxes.
Temporarily lower taxes encourage individuals to save more, and if this effect exceeds the reduction in saving caused by the transfer of some of the tax burden to future generations, crowding in will occur. Our results show that crowding in of risky investment is in fact likely to occur, but for a 5 Merton [1983) shows that "a tax and transfer system not unlike the current social sec~ity system can reduce .
or eliminate the economic inefficiencies" -that r--ult from concerned with the effect of aggregate labor income risk on risk as in this paper.
6 His discussion of fiancial crowding out and crowding in occur in a fully-employed economy. 
where c is first-period consumption and c' is second-period consumption. Both absolute risk aversion and the absolute strength of the precautionary saving motive decre=e with wealth. (We discuss these assumptions in more detail below.)
We =sume that individuals earn a fixed amount of first-period labor income. That income combined with any initial wealth provides a fixed amount of wealth w to divide between firstperiod consumption and saving. That saving can be invested in two =ts-a risk-free bond with a real after-tax gross return of R, and a risky equity with a real after-tax ezcess return of 2 (i.e., borrowing $1 at the interest rate R to buy $1 of the risky security will yield on net, after taxes and repayment of the loan, the random amount $Z at the beginning of the second period).7 We -ume that individuals can freely borrow or lend through the riskless asset and can freely invest in (or short) the risky asset.
Let~be the doZZarvaZueof the individual's investment in the risky =set at the end of the first period (not to be confused with the share of the portfolio in the risky asset). Then at the beginning of the second period, the value of all the individual's investments will be R(w -c) + a~.
We assume further that individuals hold risky human capital from which they earn income in the second period. The amount of human capital will be considered fixed as an approximation to the difference in timing between decisions about human capital investment (primarily the choice of occupation) and decisions about financial investment .8 Labor is supplied inelastically.g Following Barsky, Mankiw and Zeldes (1986) , Kimball and Mankiw (1987) , and Varian (1980) , private insurance markets are assumed to be incomplete, leaving some amount of uninsured income risk. Some of this risk may be due to the possibility of disability, but probably a We are implicitly assuming that capital income taxes are linear.
See Kanbur (1981) and Driffill and Rose; on the choice of how much human capital to hold, and and Rosen (1980) on the choice of the riskiness of human capital. labor more .
Eaton
Bodie, Merton and Samuelson (1992) study the effect of future labor supply flexibility (as opposed to labor income uncertainty) on the portfolio decisions of the young.
important source of uninsurable income risk is the possibility of doing worse than expected in one's career. This risk is difficult to insure for both moral hazard re~ons (one might be tempted to expend less effort in advancing one's career if failure is cushioned by insurance) and adverse selection reasons (those who have private information that they will do poorly in the future will be more likely to buy insurance than those who know they will do well). Providing insurance also entails marketing and administrative costs. For our purposes, the reasons for the absence of such insurance are not important. As long we consider changes in tax parameters that are small enough that the amount of relevant private insurance remains at zero, we do not need to model explicitly why such insurance is unavailable.l" Thus, we model an individual's second-period labor income as a random variable j with a fixed distribution. We want the joint distribution of labor income j and the excess return z to reflect both idiosyncratic income risk and the empirically observed positive correlation between 11 s. we~sume that~is the sum of aggregate labor income and the return on financial~sets.
three components: a constant~, a mean-zero random variable c independent of 2, plus a fractioñ of Z itself. Formally:
(Note that y is not the mean of j, but the mean of the portion of y that is uncorrelated with z.)
As will be seen, our key conclusions hold even when~= O.
The government redistributes labor income through a proportional tax on income above a certain level (yo) and a proportional rebate on income below that level. Thus, after-tax income in the second period is y.+(1-~)(y -ye). 12 Note that any first-period labor income tax is effectively a lump-sum tax, because it interacts with neither uncertainty nor labor supply elasticity. And because there is Ricardian neutrality for changes in the timing of lumpsum taxes, any tax on first-period labor income can be treated as if it were a lumpsum component of second-period labor income taxes.
10 This strategy is~h=ed by the papers cited at the beginning of the paragraph. Kaplow (1991) arWes forcef~Y that this approach is not adequate when the purpose of the study, as in Varian, is to judge the merits of government insurance. But our goal is not to determine whether taxes are an efficient solution to private insurance market failure; we simply note the absence of private insurance and the existence of government insurance, and study the effects of this situation on other features of the economic landscape. 
and O* = e(Rw+yo,1-
Our goal is to analyze the effect of changes in the tax rate on c* and a". Differentiating (7) (using subscripts for partial derivatives) reveals that da* -= -eA(Rw + yo, 1 -T) + p. dr
Thus, the effect positive whenf inancial assets)
of incre~ing the tax rate r on the amount of risky investment is always more > 0 (there is a positive correlation between the returns on human capital and than it is when~= O (the returns on human capital and financial assets are independent). In other words, when~> 0, any positive effect of labor income taxes on risky investment is enhanced. On the consumption side, (6) implies that
so that~does not alter the effect of the tax rate r on consumption.
To make progress in evaluating~and~, we must analyze the functions C(Z, A) and O(x, A).
We begin by imposing some structure on the first and second-period utility functions u(.) and v(.).
First, we~ume that~(.) and~(.) are both monotonically increasing, strictly concave functions -
that is, u(") displays decre=ing absolute risk aversion. This is a standard assumption that h= a sound empirical b=is because it is necessary for risky investment to be a normal good (to vary positively with wealth). Decreasing absolute risk aversion also insures that v'" will be positivewhich implies a positive precautionary saving motive.
Finally, we assume that
meaning that the precautionary saving motive decreases in strength with wealth. As shown in Kimball (1990a, b) , -v'''/v''-or "absolute prudence''-mewures the absolute strength of the precautionary saving motive, just as -v't/v' me=ures the absolute strength of risk aversion. Therefore, the -umption in (11) is simply that the absolute strength of the precautionary saving motive is decreasing in wealth ("decreasing absolute prudence"). This condition is plausible a priori,13 and is not very restrictive for utility functions that already exhibit decreming absolute risk aversion, in the sense that almost all commonly used utility functions with decreasing absolute risk aversion also have decre=ing absolute prudence. 14 However, if one is trying, it is not difficult to construct a utility function that, over a certain range, satisfies (10) but not (11).
III. The Effect of Labor Income Taxes on Saving and Portfolio Decisions
We are now in a position to describe the effect of changes in the labor income tax rate on an individual's total saving and on an individual's saving in a risky financial asset. We do so by proving four propositions characterizing the functions C(Z, A) and~(x, A). Recall that c is consumption in the first period; x is the nonstochastic part of second-period wealth; A is 1 minus the future tax rate T; and O equals the amount of explicit risky investment, o, plus the implicit investment in the risky asset through human capital, (1 -T)p.
Because first-period wealth is held constant, the change in total saving equals the opposite of any change in first-period consumption. Inferring changes in risky saving from changes in Ois more
See the arguments in Kimball (1990b) , one of which is the following thought experiment: "Consider a college professor who has $10,000 in the bank, and a Rockefeller who h= a net worth of $10,000,000, who have the same preferences except for their differences in initial wealth. If each is forced to face a coin toss at the beginning of the next year, with $5,OOOto be gained or lost depending on the outcome, which one will do more extra saving to be ready for the possibility of losing? If one's answer is that the college professor will do more extra saving, it arWes for decreasing absolute prudence." More mechanically, Kimball (1990b) shows that absolute prudence is decreasing as long as the wealth elasticity of risk tolerance (which is always equal to 1 for constant relative risk aversion utility) does not increase too rapidly.
For example, all utility functions in the hyperbolic absolute risk aversion class that have (weakly) decreasing absolute risk aversion (such w constant relative risk aversion or constant absolute risk aversion utility functions) also have decreasing absolute prudence, and any mixture of utility functions that individually have decreasing absolute prudence also has decreasing absolute prudence. Quadratic utility has (weakly) decreasing absolute prudence but not the more basic property of decreasing absolute risk aversion. because additional risky investment would be desirable to help insure against the increased human capital risk.
Which of these three cases is most likely? For most people,~is probably close to zero. That is, their labor income risk is primarily idiosyncratic, and their financial risk is primarily aggregate.ls
For entrepreneurs for whom the relevant risky investment is investment in their own company, will be strongly positive. Employees of brokerage houses or of firms in procyclical industries may also have a substantially positive~. Only for people with skills particularly appropriate for countercyclical industries (for example, bankruptcy lawyers) will~be negative. Since we consider the case of negative~atypical, but otherwise wish to be conservative, we concentrate on the case of@ = O to obtain a re=nable lower bound for the effect we are interested in.
We begin by considering the effects of an uncompensated change in future taxes; later we include the effects of an offsetting change in current taxes. Given the =umptions of monotonicity, concavity, decreasing absolute risk aversion and decre~ing absolute prudence, one can prove the following four propositions about C(Z, A) and 9(Z, A). Proofs can k found in Appendices A and B.
Proposition 1 says that both consumption and risky investment tncmase with wealth. 
Proving (12) requires only monotonicity and concavity. Proving (13) requires monotonicity, concavity and decre~ing absolute risk aversion. Neither (12) nor (13) depends on decreasing .
absolute prudence.
15~-that one of the jWtifications for the distinction between financial and human capita is the much greater difficdty in diversifying the latter. As shown in is the downward
Figure 1, (CZ,~z) is the vector along the wealth expansion path, and (eZ, -CZ) perpendicular to that path. Therefore the expression in (14), e=C~-C.e~, is the dot product of (C3, 0~) with the downward perpendicular to the wealth expansion path.
Proposition 2 says that along with monotonicity and concavity, decreasing absolute prudence is enough to guarantee that the dot product is always positive. This means that an increase in A moves the point (c, 8) at an acute angle to the downward perpendicular to the wealth expansion path, and thus shifts the wealth expansion path down.
Note that the shift of the optimum toward less risky investment for any given level of consump tion does not mean that an individual will always undertake less risky investment. If a decrease in the future tax rate results in a large enough increase in consumption, the individual's risky investment will increase as well. Consumption in turn is affected by two opposing forces-the increase in wealth due to the tax reduction tends to increue consumption, while the incre~ed need for precautionary saving due to the increase in risk tends to decrease consumption.
The key here is the expected value of the individual's stochastic second-period wealth, h = -uo +{, to which the taxis applied. If E k is very large, then a reduction in the tax rate produces a large enough rise in expected after-tax income to override both the precautionary saving effect and the risk crowding effect, thus raising both consumption and investment in the risky asset. If
E~is somewhat smaller, then a reduction in the tax rate produces a large enough rise in expected after-tax income to override the precautionary saving effect and raise consumption, but not enough to override the risk crowding effect and raise risky investment. And even smaller values of E k mean that a reduction in the tax rate lowers both consumption and risky investment. Proposition 16 The simple statement here is for P = O. If~> 0, the level of risky investment that goes along with any given level of consumption will fall even more with a reduction in the tax rate T. If~<0, the level of risky investment that goes along with any given level of consumption may rise with a reduction in the tax rate since risky investment wodd provide insurance for the additional human capital risk.
4 below characterizes the effect of tax= on consumption.
Proposition 3 is closely related to Proposition 2. To explain the connection, it is helpful first to view Proposition 2 as saying that an increase in labor income risk and return that leaves precautionary saving unchanged still causes a reduction in the amount of an independent financial risk which is borne. In other words, the negative interaction between independent risks-termed "temperance" by Kimball (1992) -is stronger than the precautionary saving motive. This parallels Dr&ze and Modigliani's (1972) finding that an increase in risk that leaves utility unchanged still causes an increase in the amount of precautionary saving. Kimball (1992) summarizes these results by writing that "just as decreasing absolute risk aversion implies that prudence is greater than risk aversion, decreasing absolute prudence implies that temperance is greater than prudence."
If decreasing absolute prudence makes temperance stronger than prudence, and decreasing absolute risk aversion makes prudence stronger than risk aversion, then the combination of decreasing absolute prudence and decreasing absolute risk aversion should imply that temperance is stronger than risk aversion. In particular, Proposition 3 shows that, given decreasing absolute risk aversion and decreasing absolute prudence, even a compensated increase in independent lahr incomera"sk to which an individual is indiflemnt leads to a reduction in independent risky investment.17 A fortiori, any increase in independent labor income risk that is not compensated enough to make the individual indiflennt leads to a reduction in independent risky investment. says that the combination guarantee that restit even decision.
. of d~easing absolute prudence and decreasing absolute risk aversion is enough to when the consumption/saving decision is integrated with the portfolio composition the precisenatureof preferences plays an important role. For a given change in taxes, someone with greater risk aversion is more likely to suffer a decline in utility and thus do less risky financial investment than someone with a greater tolerance for risk. But there is no straightforward way to characterize the restrictions on preferences that would be sufficient to guarantee condition (15) for any possible tax change. Therefore, we try instead to characterize the types of tax changes that would satisfy condition (15) for any preferences that meet our existing assumptions. We start with the ambiguous implication for utility of a decreme in the future tax rate combined with no change in lumpsum taxes. This means that a utility-compensating change in lumpsum taxes might be either an incre~e or a decrease. But an incre=e in lumpsum taxes large enough to leave expected tax payments unchanged would have no wealth eff't and thus unambiguously lower utility. In other words, the set of inadequately compensated changes in labor income risk necessarily includes tax changes that are intertemporally revenue-neutral.18
What kinds of tax changes will be revenue-neutral? The answer depends on the interpretation given to the model's risky financial =t.
Consider first the C-where the risky financial =t Remember that the model implies Ricardian equivalence for lump-sum taxes, ao the timing of lumpsum taxes is irrelevant.
Aggregate labor income risk will Still affect both individual incomes and government revenue. Because the government cannot insure individuals against this risk through redistributive taxes, we do not focus on it here.
or quivalently, iff E i = E [y -U() +~= -O*E Z <0.
In this second case, the effects on government revenue of both idiosyncratic labor income and financial risks are canceled out by the law of large numbers. The inequality -8*E 2~O follows from the fact that the optimal exposure to a risk is always of the same sign as its expected value.
Since in this case taxes help to diversify financial as well = nonfinancial risks, taxes are more valuable than in the first case where the risky asset represents aggregate financial risk. Thus, a revenue-neutral reduction in the tax rate is even less desirable to individuals here than in the first case, so
On sition 3
that Proposition 3 can be applied.
either interpretation of the financial risky asset, therefore, the following corollary to Propoeffectively guarantees that an intertempomlly revenue-neutml reduction in the future tax mte leads to a reduction in financial risk-bearing. Intertemporally revenue-neutral tax chang-include changes in the timing of income taxes like those discussed by Barsky, Mankiw and Zeldes (1986) and Kimball and Mankiw (1989) . By Corollary 3.1, a postponement of labor income taxes -which appears here as an increase in T and a reduction in A-crowds in risky investment.
To review, Proposition 3 says that a decre= in the future tax rate causes an less risky saving as long as the individual is not made better off by the tax change.
that a similarly strong result could be derived about the effect of such a tax change and total saving, but unfortunately this is not the case.
individual to do
It might appear on consumption
This lack of a clear result is surprising, because the effect on the consumption/saving decision of an increase in labor income risk in the absence of an additional risky investment choice is settled by Leland (1968) , Rothschild and Stiglitz (1971) , and Drbze and Modigliani (1972) . in that setting Leland (1968) shows that a single mean-zero risk leads to reduced consumption as long = u'" > 0. Rothschild and Stiglitz extend Leland's result to mean-preserving spreads. Dr&ze and Modigliani show that any undesirable risk or undesirable increase in the scale of a risk leads to reduced consumption as long = absol~e risk aversion is decreasing. This result indicates that in the absence of an additional risky investment choice, a decrease in the labor income tax rate that does not make the individual better off will lead to less consumption and more saving.
What compiicatmthe analysisof the precautionary saving effect in our model is the interaction of the labor income risk and the financial et risk. The direct effect of an imposed increase in human capital risk is still to incre~e saving through the bwic precautionary motive. But in the situation we model there is an indirect effect = well: the induced decrease in financial capital risk tends to decrease saving through the same precautionary motive. The induced decrease in financial capital risk is sometimes large enough to reduce the overall riskiness of the individual's future income, and thus lead to a net reduction in precautionary saving. Thus, our main result about the eff-t of human capital risk on other risk-taking creates ambiguity about the effect of human capital risk on total saving.
Appendix B provides a numerical counterexample to the idea that greater human capital risk must lead to less first-period consumption and more saving. The counterexample hm a utility function with decreasing absolute risk aversion and decreasing absolute prudence. For the parameter values chosen, even a mean-preserving scaling-up of human capital risk increases consumption and mdtices saving through a strong negative effect on financial risk-taking. Appendix 13 also shows that an increasein the mean of future labor income to compensatefor the effect of the increased risk on utility would reduce saving even more.
Thus, without further -umptions, one cannot prove that a scaling-up of human capital risk raises saving. Yet, it seems appropriate to expect the direct effect to outweigh the indirect effect in most circumstances. Can we identify some circumstances in which this will be true? In particular, when can we be sure that a decrease in the future tax rate that does not make an individual better off will incre~e total saving? By a mathematical connection, this quation is equivalent to the question of when two~ts whose quantities can be freely varied will both be normal goods. Proposition 4 says that an individual will save mom in response to an unpleasant tax change whenever human capital would
Proposition

then CJ(Z, A) (Z, A).
be a normal good if its quantity could be freely varied. One aspect of behavior-the one we are concerned about here-is the effect on saving of an expected-utilitypreserving incre~e in labor income risk when the amount of risky financial capital can be chosen as well. The other aspect of behavior-the one that is the basis for the proposition-is the effect of wealth on the optimal amount of risky human capital in a standard portfolio problem with another risky asset. Although these two effects may appear to be distinct, they are fundamentally the same.
4: If u'(") >0, U"(O)<0, v'(o) >0, u"(") <0 and ;(U(C) + Ev(z -Rc
The first effect is the change in saving that results from an exogenous change in human capital risk, while the second effect is the change in human capital risk that results from an exogenous change in wealth (and thus, saving). In both c~es, the direct effect is a positive relationship: an increase in risk will tend to raise saving, and an increase in wealth and saving will encourage more risktaking. 20 But in both C=es there is an Offsetting, indirect effect that arises from the individual's ability to vary another type of risk, namely financial risk.21
The intuition for this indirect effect in the first case is discussed above. The intuition in the second case is straightforward: the direct effect of extra saving on investment in the risky financial =set is positive, and the greater uncertainty about future income that this choice creates will discourage investment in other risky assets, like human capital. Thus, in both c~es the crucial issue is the complementarily (or substitutability) of human capital risk and saving in the face of endogenous adjustment of financial risk. This complementarily or substitutability is symmetric across these two c~es, which makes the condition in Proposition 4 a logical condition for the problem we are interested in.
Proposition 4 h= two corollaries. 22 First, suppose that the second-period utility function displays constant relative risk aversion, perhaps with a displaced origin; that is, suppose that v This relationship is guaranteed by the assumption of decreasing absolute risk aversion; see Kimball (1992) . P has no effect on the wealth elasticity of human capital, since optimal adjustment of financial asset holdings cancels out any und~sired changes in financial risk-bearing implicit in changes in human capital holdings. Therefore, one can assume without loss of generality that human capital and the fiancial asset have independent returns.
As an aside, there is also one implausible set of -umptions that would guarantee normality of both risks and therefore that an undesirable increase in human capital risk would lead to more saving: the combination of increasing absolute prudence and decreasing absolute risk aversion. Increasing abolute prudence, by implying is in the hyperbolic absolute risk aversion cl= and has decreasing absolute risk aversion. Then, incre=es in wealth lead to equiproportionate incre~es in holdings of the risky assets, ensuring that Second, suppose that one of the two risks h= a two-point distribution. Given decre=ing absolute risk aversion, the other risk will be normal (a result that is new with this paper). Thus, by Proposition 4, if the risky financial asset has a two-point distribution, any undesirable increase in labor income risk leads to a reduction in first-period consumption and an increase in saving:
Corollary 4.2: If u'(o) >0, u"(") <0, v'(") >0, v"(") <0, v(") exhibits decreasing absolute risk aversion, 2 is a two-point risk, and
In summary, it still appears somewhat likely that an undesirable increase in human capital risk will reduce first-period consumption and raise saving. Yet, if the financial risk has more than a two-point distribution and the utility function does not exhibit constant relative risk aversion, it is possible for an undesirable increase in human capital risk to raise first-period consumption and lower saving.24
complementarily between two independent assets, wotid guarantee that the optimal quantities of the two assets wotid go up and down together and so guarantee positive wealth elasticities. Even beyond the arguments given above for decreasing absolute prudence, these assumptions are an implausible combination: given monotonicity, concavity, and the Inada condition at infinity (u'(m) = O),globally increasing absolute prudence implies globally increasing absolute risk aversion (as one can see by reversing the direction of the proof in Kimball (1993, Appendix B) ). 23 In t~s vein, Hmt (1975) shows that conditions stringent enough to guarantee that the mix of risky securities does not depend on wealth, together with decreasing absolute risk aversion, guarantee a positive wealth elmticity for every security.
2AIndeed,the numefic~Couterexamplein AppendixB involves only a three-point distribution for the fiaIICid
IV. A Numerical Illustration
Several of the results in the previous section indicate that the effect of human capital risk on financial risk-taking can be substantial. Proposition 2 shows that this effect is at le=t as strong as the effect of human capital risk on consumption, while Proposition 3 shows that the effect is at le~t M strong as the effect of human capital risk on utility. Thus, these results imply that changes in taxes that reduce labor income risk can have a noticeable effect on financial risk-taking.
To provide more direct evidence on the magnitude of this effect, we present the following simple numerical illustration. We interpret our model as a life-cycle model, with each period lasting one generation. Let the utility function be u--.5[ln(c~) + Eln(tQ)], set the real interest rate to zero, and normalize initial resources to 2. The factor of.5 on the utility function means that a 1 percent increase in overall resources produces a .01 increase in utility. In the absence of human capital risk and any financial risk-taking opportunities, the individual would choose to consume 1 in each period, and would achieve a total utility of O. Now introduce a financial risk-taking opportunity. Suppose that borrowing one unit to invest in the risky asset has an equal chance of yielding .5 or -.25; that is, Z = .5 with probability one half and -.25 with probability one-half. It is e~y to calculate that in the absence of any human capital risk, the agent will continue Consumption in the second period will be .03.
to consume 1 in the first period and invest 1 in the risky asset. will be 1.5 or .75 with equal probability, and expected utility Finally, we add human capital risk, with a mean-zero symmetric two-point distribution, whose standard deviation after taxes is (1 -~)av. Table 1 shows optimal values of 0, c, and U for values of (1 -~)au between O and 1. Note that 0, c, and U are measured in comparable units, with a difference of .01 representing the effect of a 1 percent change in implication of our propositions that the effect of human capital risk 25 scale.25 Table 1 confirms the on risky investment is greater risk, a small mean-zero human capital risk, and a utility function that is the sum of two logarithmic utilitv functions with different origins, so there is not much room to strengthen Corollaries 4.1 an~4.2. Note th~t a utility function that is the sum of two logarithmic utility functions codd arise as a reduced form from an underlying logarithmic utility function with a third backgroundrisk. Thus, there is no way to extend Corollary 4.1 to allow for such a third (exogenous) risk. Corollary 4.2 can readily be extended to such a situation, since the financial risk wodd still have a two-point distribution, and decreasing absolute risk aversion is unaltered by a background risk.
This statement is always true for~, and is true for O and c when they are near 1. Taking logarithms of 8 and c would make the comparison more exact. than its effect on consumption, which is in turn greater than its effect on utility.
(1 -T) If the standard deviation of future labor income is .5 (within the range studied by Barsky, Mankiw and Zeldes (1986) ), then raising the future marginal tax rate from O to 20 percent causes (1 -~)oy to decline from .5 to .4. Table 1 shows that this 20 percentage point increase in the tax rate produces close to a 10 percent increase in risky investment (from .75 to .82). Thus, the semi-el~ticity of risky investment with respect to the future tax rate is roughly one-half. A 20 percentage point increase in the tax rate from 20 percent to 40 percent produces an 8 percent increase in risky investment (from .82 to .89), for asemi-el~ticity of roughly two-fifths.
The size of this effect is sensitive to the amount ofhuman capital risk,~one would expect.
If the standard deviation of future labor income is .4, for example, then an increase in the future marginal tax rate from O to 25~0 produces an 8 percent increase in risky investment, for a semiel~ticity of roughly one-third. As human capital risk declines further, the semi-elasticity of risky investment with respect to the tax rate declines as well.
There is also some direct empirical evidence that the effect ofhuman capital risk on financial risk-taking can be substantial. Guise, Jappelli, and Terlizzese (1994) study the portfolio choices of Italian households using the Survey of Income and Wealth. Their estimates suggest that the elimination of income uncertainty would increase the portfolio share of risky assets by 2 to 14 percentage points (Tables 5 and 7 ).
V. Conclusion
Individuals' ability to earn labor income is often their most valuable asset; but this =set carries with it a large and mostly unmarketable risk. A decrease in current taxes combined with an offsetting future increase in proportional or progressive labor income taxes provides insurance against this risk. (And because most labor income risk is idiosyncratic, individual uncertainty can be reduced with no increase in the uncertainty of government revenue.) Barsky, Mankiw and Zeldes (1986) show that the reduction in idiosyncratic labor income risk acts through the precautionary saving motive to reduce saving relative to a Ricardian benchmark. In this paper we show that the reduction in idiosyncratic labor income risk affects portfolio decisions as well.
We analyze the effect of labor income risk on the joint saving/portfolio-composition decision in a two-period model. We show that, given plausible restrictions on preferences, any change in taxes that reduces an individual's labor income risk and does not make her worse off will lead her to invest more in a risky security, even if its return is statistically independent of the labor income risk. A deferral of labor income taxes with no change in their expected present value is one such tax change.
An additional curious result is that the effect of labor income risk on portfolio composition can be so powerful that consequent indirect effects overturn the usual positive effect of labor income risk on overall saving that is familiar from the precautionary saving literature. Ruling Out this possibility requires relatively strict assumptions, such as constant relative risk aversion or a twopoint distribution for the return on the financial asset. This counterintuitive result turns out to be related to the difficulty of guaranteeing that a pair of independent risks will both be normal goods.
One implication of our results concerns the effect of government debt issuance on risky investment. Suppose that the government reduces taxes today and raises taxes in the future, although not necessarily by a corresponding amount. The results in Section III imply that this increase in government debt will crowd in risky investment whenever any of the following conditions is satisfied:
(1) the expected present value of taxes faced by an individual is unchanged-i.e., there is a change only in the timing of taxes (Corollary 3.1);
(2) the incre=ed future taxes have a strong enough insurance effect that the policy raises expected utility (Proposition 3); or (3) the tax changes lead to higher current consumption (Proposition 2).
Thus we concur with Friedman (1978) that crowding in will occur when the government reduces taxes now and pays off the debt with higher taxes in the future.26 But our results are based on 26~~el (1985) estimates that pol-tfo~o effects on rates of return are very small, but that crowding in Of equity investment is more likely than crowding out. We can foresee two ways in which an empirical analysis based on our approach would differ from Frankel's. First, Frankel does not allow for the effects of future tax liabilities, which play an important role in our analysis. Second, Frankel constrains government debt to affect asset demands only through changes in the market portfolio, and therefore through the covariances of asset returns with the market portfolio. In our approach, the risk aversion of the indirect utility function depends on expected future tax rates; therefore, changing those rates changes the market risk premium. in other risky assets, 27 but Cwts some doubt on the generality of previous results about the effect of labor income risk on total saving.28
27 It may be~~rising that we Cm establish such clear results about labor income taxes and financial risk-taking when the literature on capital income taxes and financial risk-taking is replete with ambiguities. The main explanation for the difference is that individuals cannot trade away their risky human capital in the way that they can trade away risky financial assets.
28 One~rection for fmther rese~ch is to extend our restits to models with more than two periods. Kimball (1990b) gives one idea of how this might be done. In a multiperiod model, the absolute risk aversion of the value function is equal to the product of the absolute risk aversion of the underlying period utility function and the marginal propensity to consume out of wealth. Under conditions similar to those we assume, idiosyncratic labor income risk raises the absolute risk aversion of the value function both by raising the marginal propensity to consume out of wealth and by raising the absolute risk aversion of the underlying period utility function through lowering consumption. Equivalently, Breeden (1986) finds that for continuous-time diffusion processes, the expected rate of return differential between risky and riskless securities should be equal to the product of an agent's underlying risk aversion and the covariance of the rate of return differential with consumption growth. Grossman and Shiner (1982) show that this relationship can be aggregated: the market risk premium should be equal to the product of a weighted average of agents' underlying risk aversions and the covariance between the rate of return differential and aggregate consumption growth. Idiosyncratic labor income risk raises the premium for holding risky assets in two ways: by lowering consumption, and therefore underlying risk aversion, and by raising the marginal propensity to consume out of wealth and therefore the covariance of consumption with the returns on risky securities in which agents have substantial positions. decreasing absolute risk aversion from v.
Both Nachman (1982) and Kihlstrom, Romer and Williams (1981) give proofs of Lemma 3. Since decre~ing absolute risk aversion is equivalent to convexity of ln (v'(z) Proof. Decreasing absolute prudence is equivalent to convexity of ln (-v") . Therefore, for any four quantities Z1, 22, hl and h2,
when (Z2 -Z1) (h2 -hl) z O, with the direction of the inequality in (A.21) reversed when ( 22 -z1)(h2 -hl)~O. Exponentiating both sides of (A.21) and subtracting, the quantity always has the same sign as (Z2-Z1) (h2 -hi). Thus, if 21, :2, 11 and~2 are mutually independent random variables with il and 22 having the same distribution as 5, and kl and fi2 having the same distribution M fi, then Thus, for sufficiently small mean-zero~, the effect of~on saving has the same sign as is the optimal adjustment in 8 when x changes with A remaining fixed. With~held fixed, AL is a fixed background risk, and the decre~ing absolute risk aversion of v is enough to guarantee that M > ().
dz -
Denote the two possible realizations of 2 as Zl, which occurs with probability p, and 22, which occurs with probability (1 -p). Then, the equation Je = O, which characterizes an optimal value of 0, becomes But, by the definition of vi, the right-hand side of (B.21) is less than or equal to zero. Thus, the left-hand side of (B.21) is also less than or equal to zero, implying Therefore, (B.18) implies (B.16).= Intuitively, the key to the proof is that with a twmpoint distribution for z, an increase in x wit h its consequent increase in 8 leads to an increase in z -RC + Ozi for both~= 1 and~= 2.
This incre~e in x -Rc + Ozi leads to an incre~e in the marginal benefit of higher A relative to the expected marginal utility v' for both i = 1 and i = 2. Since the condition for optimal Oinsures that the importance of expected marginal utility for i = 1 and z = 2 is in a fixed ratio, this leads to an increase in the overall marginal benefit of A. 
